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I. INTRODUCTION
Under an official policy euphemistically entitled "humane
deterrence," the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong has detained
tens of thousands of Vietnamese asylum seekers' in prison-like
conditions.2 The stated purpose of this policy is to use Vietnamese

* This Article has been adapted from a legal brief prepared by the law firm Weil, Gotshal
& Manges and submitted to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Working Group). The Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights and the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, on behalf of
approximately 40,000 Vietnamese detainees, have filed an action with the Working Group
requesting relief from the Hong Kong government's law and practice of arbitrarily detaining
Vietnamese asylum seekers in violation of current international norms as established by treaty
and customary law.
** Eve B. Burton, Columbia Law School, 1989, and David B. Goldstein, Harvard Law
School, 1985, are associates with the law firm Well, Gotshal & Manges in New York City. For
all their assistance and support, the authors would like to thank James W. Quinn and David
Proshan from Well, Gotshal & Manges, Arthur Helton and Ann Parrent from the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Liv Ullman from the Women's Commission for Refugee Women
and Children, and Pene Mathews, Lecturer in Law at the University of Melbourne Law School.
1. SUBMISSION To THE UNITED NATIONS WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION
BY THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR
REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN ON BEHALF OF APPROXIMATELY 40,000 VIETNAMESE

DETAINEES, INCLUDING THE FAMILIES OF PHAM NGOC LAM, VUONG SON BACH AND CAM
GIA NINH, Apr. 15, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION] (on file with
authors). More than 78 percent are women and children; somewhat less than half of the
children are under the age of five. DIANA D. BUI, A SNAPSHOT IN TIME: IMPROVEMENTS IN
TiE CONDITIONS OF REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN DETENTION IN HONG KONG 3

(Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children 1991).
2. Beryl Cook, Policy on Vietnamese 'Breaches Laws,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 22,
1993, at 5. For a discussion of the illegality under international law of the detention of
Vietnamese asylum seekers, see JANELLE M. DILLER, IN SEARCH OF ASYLUM: VIETNAMESE
BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 18-20 (Indochina Resource Center 1988); see also International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 183d plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A.
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asylum seekers as hostages to deter their fellow citizens from

attempting to flee from Vietnam Hong Kong's policy, in which one
group is punished to deter potential acts of others who are related
solely by national origin, is a particularly cruel form of arbitrary
detention in violation of international law.

Currently, there are approximately 45,000 Vietnamese asylum
seekers4 held in thirteen detention centers scattered throughout Hong
Kong.5 Thousands of these detainees have been held for three or
more years.6 Police brutality occurs and virtually no outsiders are
permitted to monitor the detention centers.7 Women are often
raped, and children are routinely exposed to violence! Schools,
health facilities, and social services are practically nonexistent.9
Conditions have not improved in five years.1 0
The Hong Kong government codified the principle of "humane
deterrence" in its immigration law in 1987.11 All Vietnamese asylum

seekers are automatically detained upon arrival in Hong Kong and
are held indefinitely for prolonged periods of time. 2 This law and
practice is defective for at least three reasons. First, it is illegal to
detain one person for the sole purpose of altering the behavior of

others, i.e., to halt the flow of asylum seekers from Vietnam. 3
Second, independent of the purpose, indefinite prolonged detention
is in itself impermissible. 14 Finally, even though prolonged detention

Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. See LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INHUMANE DETERRENCE: THE
TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 8-10 (1989) [hereinafter
INHUMANE DETERRENCE].
4. WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Larry Kohl, Plight of the Boat People, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1991, at 133-34.
Approximately 23,000 asylum seekers are held in the Whitehead Detention Camp in Hong
Kong's New Territories, which, along with other centers, is under the jurisdiction of, and
operated by, Hong Kong Correctional Services. See WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra note
1, at 1; Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. IRA, § 13C(4) (1987).
6. See Cook, supra note 2, at 5.
7. DILLER, supra note 2, at 35-36, 38-39.
8. See id. at 34-41.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 33. "Until September 1988, government policy prohibited access to all
detention centres by any outside organization except UNHCR [United Nations High
Commission on Refugees], which received extremely restricted access." I6
11. Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. IA, § 13D(1) (1987).
12. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 3.
13. Id.; see WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 2.
14. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 3; WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra
note 1, at 2.
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is allowable under specific, limited circumstances, there must be an
individualized judicial determination that the individual will flee or be
a danger to society.
Hong Kong has made no such individual
6
determinations.1
It should be noted that the plight of the Vietnamese in Hong
Kong is not solely Hong Kong's responsibility. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, Hong Kong served as a country of "first asylum."' 7 It
was the policy of the United States and other nations that the
Vietnamese be offered permanent resettlement in the West. 8 In the
mid 1980s, the increasing reluctance of resettlement countries to
absorb the Vietnamese, in combination with international pressure
against forcible repatriation, particularly from the United States, led
to increasing numbers of asylum seekers being "stranded" in Hong
Kong. 9
This Article proposes that Hong Kong's law and policy constitute
arbitrary detention of a class of people in violation of international
norms and international human rights. Part II reviews the status of
the detainees under Hong Kong law, discussing both Hong Kong and
United Kingdom law as it applies to the Vietnamese. Part III looks
at the international law on detainees in general, and sets forth the
minimal standards imposed on states by conventions and customary
law. Part IV deals with the jurisdiction of the United Nations in
matters such as these. Finally, Part V reviews the appropriate actions
to be taken by the governments of Hong Kong or the United
Kingdom with respect to the detained Vietnamese asylum seekers.

15. See WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 2; see also infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
16. See WORKING GROUP SUBMISSION, supra note 1, at 2.
17. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 8-10. "Vietnamese boat people who arrived
in Hong Kong between July 2, 1982 and June 15, 1988 are given first asylum in Hong Kong."
Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 8.
Under the 1979 Geneva Convention, Viet Nam instituted an orderly departure
program, which permitted emigration directly from Viet Nam to the West. In 1984 and
1985, legal departures via the program were higher than clandestine departures. As
pledged, many countries accepted refugees for permanent asylum. The respite,
however, was a brief one .... The balance established at the Geneva Conference began
to unravel in 1986. On January 1, 1986 Viet Nam suspended its orderly departure
program to the United States, which had accepted for resettlement over half of those
legally departing. The number of refugees taken for resettlement in third countries
dwindled, while the number seeking asylum increased.
Id.
19. INHUMANE DETERRENcE, supra note 3, at 8; see Kohl, supra note 5, at 136.
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II. STATUS OF DETAINEES UNDER HONG KONG LAW
AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW
A. History of Treatment of Detainees
Since 1975 more than one million Vietnamese have clandestinely
left their homeland, many seeking asylum on the neighboring shores
of Southeast Asia, including Hong Kong? ° Those Vietnamese that
entered Hong Kong prior to 1982 were allowed to live in open camps
and to move freely around the city.21 Many even held jobs.'
Those arriving after 1982 lived in closed camps for relatively short
periods while waiting to be resettled in a third country.' This initial
policy shift to closed camps signaled Hong Kong's increasing hostility
towards granting the Vietnamese temporary asylum with appropriate
legal safeguards.
Since June 16, 1988, Hong Kong has altered its policy toward the
Vietnamese drastically. All arriving Vietnamese are now automatically held in detention centers and are subject to a refugee screening
process.24 Hong Kong has been intent on creating inhumane
conditions for the Vietnamese in order to deter future asylum
seekers.' In fact, the conditions under which the detainees live are
worse than those of the prisons in Hong Kong. 26 Moreover, violence, including murder, is perpetuated by guards and gangs.27

20. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 7.
21. DILLER, supra note 2, at 54.

22. Id
23. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 10.
24. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1992, REPORT SUBMITrED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FOR. RELATIONS AND

HOUSE COMM. ON FOR. AFFAIRS 967 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS];
see also DILLER, supra note 2, at 18; INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 10-11.
25.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REVIEW OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, at 426,427 (1992).
26. Simon Winchester, Inside the Hong Kong Detention Camp, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Jan.

3, 1993, at 10. Although the conditions in the camps raise serious international law questions,
neither this Article nor the Working Group Submission directly addresses this issue.
Nevertheless, because the conditions of detention serve as a deterrent to Vietnamese coming
to Hong Kong, they should be a factor in determining whether detention is arbitrary. See
INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 3. Furthermore, these harsh conditions emphasize

the need for an expeditious end to the mass arbitrary detention.
27. See Winchester, supra note 26, at 10; see also Fiona MacMahon, Inmates Unprotected
in Detention Camps, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 4,1993, at 3 (describing security conditions

at the Whitehead Detention Camp).
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Children and women are the least protected and most vunerable
portion of the population.
Recent developments in Hong Kong have made the situation
worse. Since June 1993 all social services have been curtailed.29
Indeed, since August 1993 there have been no medical, social, or
educational programs in the camps. 3 It is very likely that violence
will escalate as a consequence of these actions.' In 1992, when
Hong Kong cut basic services, there was a massive riot resulting in the
deaths of twenty-four Vietnamese at Sek Kong Camp.32
1. The Special Problems of Vietnamese Children. Perhaps the
single most traumatic element for Vietnamese children held in
prolonged detention in Hong Kong has been the constant exposure
to violence. Studies show that unaccompanied children especially live
in constant fear of being harmed.33 Most children, if not all, have
witnessed many serious acts of violence?' Numerous child psychologists have stated that the long-term impact of violence on children in
detention is seriously retarded emotional growth.3'
Children in the camps are also vulnerable to serious health
problems.36 Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions have caused
the uncontrolled spread of communicable diseases.37 A chicken pox
epidemic affected a majority of the one thousand children at San Yick
Camp in 1988.38 Other childhood diseases such as measles have

28. Emptying the Camps, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File (evaluating the prospects of worsening living conditions).
29. See Memorandum from Duyen Nguyen to Kathy Howe of the Lutheran Immigration
and Refugee Service (Mar. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Lutheran Immigration] (on file with authors).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE: LAWYERS FOR REFUGEES, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 2; see
COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 24, at 967.
33. See REFUGEE CONCERN HONG KONG, DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION: VIETNAMESE
CHILDREN LIVING AMIDST INCREASING VIOLENCE IN HONG KONG, 52 (1991) [hereinafter

DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION]; Lutheran Immigration, supra note 29, at 1; Memorandum from
Duyen Nguyen to Kathy Howe of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (Apr. 2,1993)
(on file with author). The evidence also suggests that children accompanied by their parents

fare better. See Jane Warburton;, Unaccompanied Minors in Hong Kong Detention Centres,in
FORUM ON UNACCOMPANIED MINORS IN HONG KONG 23-27 (1992).
34. See DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION, supra note 33, at 52.
35. See JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE, supranote 32, at 2; DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION, supra
note 33, at 48-61.
36. See DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION, supra note 33, at 105.
37. Id. at 106; see DILLER, supra note 2, at 40 (describing the potential for epidemics).
38. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 12.
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caused death among many detained children.39 Due to the conditions in the camps, reinfection is common. ° Moreover, when a
medical condition necessitates hospitalization, children are routinely
separated from their families. 41 Medical personnel treating the
children rarely speak Vietnamese, and no one is assigned to protect
the best interests of the child. 42
The children in the camps lack adequate educational facilities as
well.43 Problems with schools in the detention centers include
ineffective teachers, inadequate textbook resources, rampant
absenteeism among the older students, and study areas that are not
conducive to learning.' Since 1983 the government has forbidden
Vietnamese children to attend Hong Kong educational institutions.45
2. The Special Concerns of Vietnamese Women. All detainees,
though women in particular, are at risk of violence and other harassment.' The lack of security in the camps makes women easy targets
of abuse.47 Vietnamese gangs operate freely in the camps. 48 Police
and corrections officers fail to provide adequate protection from the
violent minority.49 Cases have been reported of government officials
themselves harassing and raping Vietnamese women, and offering
protection in exchange for sexual favors.50 In some camps, the
women have asked to live in special units where they can lock
themselves in at night, but permission has been refused.5 '
Women in the camps also face inhumane conditions during
pregnancy.5 2 Pregnant women are moved to the Victoria Prison

39. WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY: A SNAPSHOT IN TIME 14 (1991) [hereinafter WOMEN'S COMMISSION]. A cholera
epidemic has also led to increased malnutrition among children. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 8.
42. See DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION, supra note 33, at 107; WOMEN'S COMMISSION, supra
note 39, at 8.
43. DEFENSELESS IN DETENTION, supra note 33, at 102-04.
44. Id.
45. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 12.

46. Ld.
47. Id. at 10.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. WOMEN'S COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 8. There are several cases in which mothers
are identified in the camps by number only, and give birth to children similarly designated. Id.
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Hospital at thirty-six weeks to await delivery 3 During these
difficult weeks away from their husbands and children, "[t]hey
[Vietnamese women] await their childbirth without emotional support,
guidance or, in most instances, someone who speaks Vietnamese to
assure them during their labor."'
B. Current Status of Hong Kong Law
1. Positionof the Government of Hong Kong. The legal basis
for Hong Kong's humane deterrence policy and for holding all
incoming Vietnamese asylum seekers in closed centers is The Hong
Kong Immigration Ordinance (Ordinance). 5 The Ordinance, which
contains a section specifically regarding Vietnamese asylum seekers,
authorizes Hong Kong officials to detain indefinitely "any resident or
former resident of Vietnam who arrives in Hong Kong not holding a
[valid] travel document."56 Under the Ordinance a person may be
detained "in such detention centre as an immigration officer may
specify pending a decision to grant or refuse him such permission to
remain in Hong Kong or, after a decision to refuse him such
permission, pending his removal from Hong Kong."' In addition,
the Ordinance fails to provide even the most minimal procedural
safeguards prior to detaining the Vietnamese.58 For example, there
are no provisions that require that the detention be linked to a
reliable and individualized judicial or administrative determination
that the asylum seeker is likely to abscond or pose a threat to public
order or public health in Hong Kong. 9
Moreover, the law forbids any challenge to the underlying legality
of the detention.6 Although nonrefugee Vietnamese may theoreti-

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. liA, § 13 (1987).
56. See Ordinance (H.K. 52/91), LAWS OF HONG KONG (1991).

Only the Vietnamese

"screened in" for resettlement in third countries are considered refugees; those awaiting
screening, and those "screened out" and detained pending removal to Vietnam, are not refugees.
For a discussion of the procedures for determination of refugee status, see DILLER, supra note
2, at 83.
57. Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. IIIA, § 13D(1) (1987).
58. DILLER, supra note 2, at 83-89.
59. See id. at 91.
60. Id. at 99. In addition, asylum seekers cannot challenge their detention based on the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights because section 11 of the Bill of Rights expressly exempts from its

protection "persons not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong." Hong Kong Bill
of Rights Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 59, pt. III, § 11 (1991).
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cally apply for the common law writ of habeas corpus in order to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention, such challenge would not
be effective because:
[t]he most fundamental weakness of the [Hong Kong habeas
corpus] remedy is that it is parasitic upon the general features of
the legal system. If that system confers wide powers of arrest and
detention upon the executive then, provided the authorities follow61
the correct procedure, the writ will avail the applicant of nothing.

Because the detention of the Vietnamese is made expressly lawful
under Section 13D of the Ordinance, it cannot be remedied through
a writ of habeas corpus.62 The effect, therefore, of automatic
detention in combination with these procedural defects is an arbitrary
and illegitimate detention which may continue indefinitely without
any legal recourse.'
The process Which Vietnamese asylum seekers must undergo to
qualify for legal status in Hong Kong is long and arduous.64 The
Vietnamese are subject to a refugee determination process, commonly
referred to as the "screening procedure."'65 To qualify for resettlement in a third country the Vietnamese applicant must demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the Hong Kong government and United Nations
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) officials that he or she is
a refugee in accordance with the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention)' and the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Proto67
col).

61. David Clark, Liberty and Security of the Person:Habeas Corpus,in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HONG KONG 301,306 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1992).
62. DILLER, supra note 2, at 98-100.
63. See id.at 90-101.
64. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 20-26.

65. Id. at 20. Under treaty and customary international law, there is a universal obligation
for a state to consider an individual's application for refugee status. See sources cited supra note
2; DILLER, supra note 2, at 90-91.

66. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
67. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967,606 U.N.T.S. 267; INHUMANE
DETERRENCE, supra, note 3, at 10, 11. The Convention and the Protocol define a refugee as:
any person who[,]... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra, art. 1(2); Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra note 66, art. 1 A(2).
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A determination of refugee status by the Hong Kong government
and the UNHCR under this screening procedure is in large measure
pro, forma.' According to the Hong Kong government, "all Vietnamese migrants arriving in [the Colony] are treated as illegal
'69
immigrants unless they are determined ... to be refugees.
Statistics demonstrate Hong Kong's reluctance to recognize the
Vietnamese as refugees.!' In March 1993, 94 percent of the 44,301
Vietnamese in Hong Kong either had been screened out and retained
their classification as illegal immigrants or were still awaiting a status
determination and hence were presumptively illegal.7 ' All these
individuals are presently being held in detention centers for the
indefinite future.7 - Even those Vietnamese who have been officially
determined to be refugees remain in detention pending their
movement to a resettlement country, a process which may take weeks
or months.73
2. Position of the Government of the United Kingdom. The
Hong Kong government's policy of prolonged detention of Vietnamese asylum seekers directly implicates the government of the United
Kingdom. Hong Kong, of course, is not an independent, sovereign
state; rather, it is a dependency of the United Kingdom. As such, the
United Kingdom, as a sovereign state and the colonial power, has
ultimate international responsibility for the actions of the Hong Kong
government.7 4
Because Hong Kong is a dependent territory, the British
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is
constitutionally responsible to the British Parliament for the actions

68. See, eg., INHuMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 23 (describing examples of the
inadequacies of screening); DILLER, supra note 2, at 21-26 (noting problems in the screening
process).
69. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE OFFICE, FACT SHEET 1 (Dec.

1992).
70. DILLER, supra note 2, at 83.
71. See Lutheran Immigration, supra note 29.
72. DILLER, supra note 2, at 90.

73. See Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. lI/A, § 13 (1987).
Vietnamese refugees are entitled to certain procedures relating to their detention pursuant to
sections 13A and 13B of the Ordinance, concerning conditions of detention and appeal. These
provisions, however, are applicable only during the relatively brief period between determination
of refugee status and resettlement.

74. See Letters Patentsand Royal Instructions to the Governor of Hong Kong, reprintedin
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLrTICs OF HONG KONG app. 3(C) at 327 (1981)

[hereinafter Letters Patents].
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of the Hong Kong government, and has substantial authority to give
directions to Hong Kong's Governor.75 Pursuant to the Letters
Patent, the British government also has international responsibility for
Hong Kong's actions under international conventions and agreements
that the United Kingdom has extended to Hong Kong.7"
The United Kingdom has acceded to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant),' and has extended the
Covenant to Hong Kong.7 The United Kingdom is also a signatory
to the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, 9 which established
systematic refugee screening procedures for Vietnamese and other
Southeast Asian asylum seekers by countries of first asylum such as
Hong Kong.' The British government's decision to grant considerable autonomy to Hong Kong, including Hong Kong's treatment of
asylum seekers, does not absolve the United Kingdom, as the colonial
power, of its international responsibility to ensure that its dependency
fulfills these and other international law obligations.8"
75. However, according to a Hong Kong government publication, "such formal directions
have not been issued in living memory, and Hong Kong conducts its affairs with a high degree
of autonomy in all domestic matters." GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES HONG KONG
1993, at 25 (H. Witt ed., 1993). "[MIn the day-to-day conduct of external affairs, Hong Kong in
practice enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy." Id.
76. See Letters Patents,supra note 74, at 328.
77. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 2.
78. The United Kingdom became a party to the Covenant in 1976, without reservations with
respect to Article 9 regarding arbitrary detention. In its instrument of ratification, dated May
20, 1976, the United Kingdom extended application of the Covenant to Hong Kong. See
DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE INTHE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTs 308 (1991). On June
8,1992, Hong Kong enacted the local enabling statute, the Bill of Rights Ordinance. Ordinance
(H.K. 59/91), LAWS OF HONG KONG pt. I, § 2(3) (1991). This legislation incorporated the
Covenant, including Article 9, into Hong Kong law. Id. A section of the Ordinance, however,
purports to exempt from the Covenant's scope immigration legislation or its application
regarding "persons not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong." Id., pt. I1, § 11.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, has not been extended to Hong Kong. See
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 63, 213 U.N.T.S 221 (requiring an affirmative act for extension of the European
Convention "to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible").
Thus, the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
do not have jurisdiction over claims against the Hong Kong government.
79. For further discussion of the Comprehensive Plan of Action, see Josh Brigg, Comment,
Sur Place Refugee Status in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM.
U.L. REV. 433, 439-41 nn.38-49 (1993).

80. See id. at 440 nn.41-45, nn.60-67, and accompanying text.
81. See Letters Patents,supranote 74, at 328, 337-38. Neither the Working Group's ability

to bring violations to the attention of the governments of Hong Kong and the United Kingdom
nor the substantive right of the Vietnamese under international law to be free of arbitrary
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The Hong Kong government, however, may not avoid its own
obligations and duties under international law on the ground that it
is not a sovereign state. Although the United Kingdom is clearly
complicit and ultimately responsible for Hong Kong's actions, the
indefinite detention of all Vietnamese asylum seekers is carried out
as the official policy of the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong
legislature established the detention policies,' the Hong Kong
authorities administer the refugee screening process,83 and the Hong
Kong Department of Corrections runs the detention centers. 8' Thus,
Hong Kong itselt having chosen to exercise the authority granted to
it by the United Kingdom as it has, should be held accountable for its
failure to conform its policies and practices to international law,
including the right of all persons under its jurisdiction to be free from
arbitrary detention.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DETAINEES
A. The Illegality of Indefinite, Prolonged, and Arbitrary Detention
The detention prescribed in the Ordinance violates both
customary international law and treaty prohibitions against prolonged
arbitrary detention.' The first and most critical condemnation of this
sort of state action is found in the language of the Universal
Declaration,86 the document that forms the legal cornerstone of
international human rights. The Universal Declaration states: "No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."' It
further provides: "All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."' The
Universal Declaration clearly states that "everyone is entitled to all
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as... national or social origin... birth

detention should turn on the complexities of the juridical relationship between the United
Kingdom and Hong Kong, or on their respective relations with the international community.
82. Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. IIIA, § 13D (1987).
83. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 10-11.
84. Id. at 15-16.
85. DILLER, supra note 2, at 90-91.

86. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 2, at 71-77.
87. Id. art. 9, at 73.
88. Id. art. 7, at 73.
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or other status."89 These fundamental principles have long been
accepted by international bodies and courts."
Additional support for the fundamental right to be free from
arbitrary detention is found in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,9' a treaty which the United Kingdom has
extended to Hong Kong. 2 Article 9(1) of the Covenant provides
broadly and without reservation that "[e]veryone has the right to
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention."' Moreover, Article 9(4) states that "[a]nyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful."'94 This fundamental right to
be free from arbitrary detention must, according to the Covenant, be
applied to "all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction... without distinction of any kind."'
The prohibitions of arbitrary detention in both the Covenant and
the Universal Declaration make no distinction based on citizenship or
residency. It is no answer for Hong Kong to argue that the Vietnamese have no right to enter Hong Kong or that their entry is illegal.
Whatever their official status, while they are within the territory of
Hong Kong, the Vietnamese-who are simply exercising their right to
seek asylum from persecution under Article 14(1) of the Universal
Declaration -- are entitled to the protection of the fundamental

89. Id. art. 2, at 72.
90. For example, the International Court of Justice, ruling on the seizure of the United
States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and on the subsequent detention of members of the
Embassy staff, held as a matter of customary international law that Iran "[w]rongfully ...
deprive[d] human beings of their freedom and ... subject[ed] them to physical constraint in
conditions of hardship." Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,43 (May 24). Such actions, the Court held, were "manifestly
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the
fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Id.
91. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 2, at 52-60.
92. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
93. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 2, art. 9(1), at 54.
94. Id. art. 9(4), at 54.
95. Id. art. 2(1), at 53; see id. art. 26 (prohibiting discrimination before the law on the basis
of "national or social origin").
96. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 14(1), at 74 ("Everyone has
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.").
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human rights contained in the Covenant and the Universal Declaration. 97
In addition to these international instruments, relevant case law
has shown that one of the key tests in determining whether detention
is "arbitrary" under Article 9(1) is whether the detention is "reasonable," regardless of compliance with domestic laws.98 As one panel
of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Committee) wrote:
The drafting history of article 9[(1) of the Covenant] confirms that
"arbitrariness" is not to be equated with "against the law," but
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. This means that
remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest [and detention] must
not only be lawful but reasonable in all the circumstances. 9
The Committee further held that, pursuant to Article 9(1), "remand
in custody" must be necessary to prevent certain dangers such as to
"prevent ffight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of
, 100
crime.
Much of the case law addressing arbitrary detention pursuant to
Articles 9(1) and 9(4) of the Covenant involves situations in which a
state government is acting in compliance with the local law, but
allegedly is in violation of the broader rights contained in the
Covenant.01 The principles developed in this case law establish that
Hong Kong's "humane deterrence" policy is illegal. In fact, none of
the cases where the Committee has found a violation are nearly as
egregious as this situation."° Most involve one or two individu97. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETERIAT, COMPILATION OF GENERAL
COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY

BODIES, General Comment 8, at 7, U.N. Doc. HRIJGEN/1 (1992).
98. Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands, as cited in Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (VII), at 108, U.N. Doc. A/45/45/40 (1990)
[hereinafter van Alphen].
99. Id. para. 5.8.
100. Id.
101. The Human Rights Committee first inquires whether the detention violates local law.
If local law has not been followed, the Committee usually finds that the state is in violation of
Articles 9(1) and 9(4). See id. para. 5.6. In the van Alphen case, the Committee also found that
continued detention was unnecessary since there was no evidence that van Alphen would flee,
harm society, or destroy evidence. Id. para. 5.8.
102. Two cases involving Uruguay are particularly instructive. In David Alberto Campora
Schweizer v. Uruguay, as cited in Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 35th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 117, U.N. Doc. A138/40 (1983) [hereinafter Schweizer], the Human Rights
Committee found Uruguay to have arbitrarily detained an individual for his political views based
on a local law that was not in compliance with the Covenant. Uruguay argued that Schweizer
was detained under the rules of "Prompt Security Measures," which allowed the government to
keep him in prison indefinitely. This rule, the Committee held, as "ordered, maintained and
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als.l° In no reported instance has a government detained 45,000
people arbitrarily and indefinitely.
B. The Illegality of the Absence of Individualized Review
The cornerstone of any objective determination of whether a
government's actions are arbitrary is the availability of an individualized hearing before an independent body."°4 The Committee has
made it clear that in order to justify the legitimate continuation of
detention, there must be an individualized judicial determination in
which the government bears the burden of showing by persuasive
evidence that a person will (1) abscond, (2) destroy evidence, or (3)
pose a distinct threat to society. 5 These three grounds evidence
reasonable and necessary considerations for the continuation of
detention. Even in the case of individuals who pose a threat to
national security, it is unusual for the Committee to sanction
indefinite detention. 6 Under this standard, there are very few

enforced" was arbitrary and did not comply with Article 9. Furthermore, the Committee was
concerned that no individualized determination was made regarding such factors as his risk to
society, and that there was no remedy under the local law for Schweizer to challenge the legality
of his detention. The humane deterrence policy in Hong Kong, which permits the indefinite
detention of all Vietnamese without any regard for their individual circumstances, is at least as
arbitrary as Uruguay's Prompt Security Measures.
The Committee also determined that another detention scenario under Uruguay's Prompt
Security Measures was arbitrary in Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, as cited in Report of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 176, U.N. Doc. A136140
(1981) [hereinafter Salidas de Lopez] (finding the Uruguayan government's abduction of an
Uruguayan refugee in Argentina and its later detention of the refugee under Prompt Security
Measures constituted arbitrary detention under Article 9(1)). In both these cases, the
Committee was concerned with bringing the accused to trial within a reasonable amount of time.
Moreover, there had been no hearing by an independent authority, such as a court, to determine
the legality of the detention.
103. E.g., Schweizer, supra note 102; Salidas de Loepz, supra note 102; van Alphen, supra
note 98.
104. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 2, art. 14(1), at 54.
105. See van Alphen, supra note 98, para. 5.8 (stating that remand in custody must be
reasonable and necessary, considering the totality of the circumstances).
106. In V.M.R.B. v. Canada, as cited in Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 258, 259 U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988), the Human Rights
Committee found that continued detention, pending deportation, was warranted since Canada
had reliable and presentable evidence that V.M.R.B. was "tasked and funded by a foreign
political party to carry out certain activities which are prohibited under Canadian law" and in
a manner which threatened national security. See also J.R.C. v. Costa Rica, as cited in Report
of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 293, U.N. Doc.
A/44/40 (1989) (keeping a terrorist detained while deportation is pending may be valid on
national security grounds); Penarrieta v. Bolivia, as cited in Report of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 199, U.N. Doec. A/43/40 (1988) (finding an
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instances where the Committee has determined that indefinite
detention is permissible.'" There has never been a reported case
where indefinite detention is permissible when there has been no
individualized hearing.'"
Hong Kong does not provide individualized hearings to Vietnamese detainees."° Were Hong Kong to grant them individualized
judicial hearings, most (and virtually all women and children)
detainees would be found to present neither a serious risk of danger
to society nor a risk of absconding.'
Historical evidence shows
that when the camps were open, the Vietnamese asylum seekers lived
and worked in Hong Kong without conflict with the Chinese in Hong
Kong."' Similarly, the risk of flight is remote, since those Vietnamese not yet screened have every reason to appear for their screening
hearings with the Hong Kong government, as this is their only
possibility of obtaining legal refugee status."' The risk that the
Vietnamese will leave Hong Kong to seek refuge illegally in another
country presents no harm to the Hong Kong government, as its goal
is to have these people leave the Colony."' If the Hong Kong
authorities are concerned that individuals might somehow "melt" into
Hong Kong society, the burden is on the Hong Kong government to
establish in individualized hearings that no reasonable conditions short
of continued detention would prevent a particular individual from
disappearing." 4
C. Illegality of Detention Under Regional Treaties and
Accompanying Case Law
Other international conventions, such as the European Convention"5' and the American Convention on Human Rights," 6 also
Article 9(3) violation of the Covenant because the accused were not processed promptly).
Moreover, in both of these cases the complaining individuals had judicial hearings in which the
government made a showing of the need for continued detention. Nothing approaching such
a procedural safeguard is available in Hong Kong.
107. See cases supra notes 102, 106.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
110. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 3.

111. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
112. See DILLER, supra note 2, at 21-32.
113. Immigration Ordinance, LAWS OF HONG KONG ch. 115, pt. IIIA, § 13A(3) (1987).
114. van Alphen, supra note 98, para. 5.8.
115. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221.
116. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records,
OEAISer. K/XVII1.1, Doc. 65 (Rev. 1), Corr. 2 (1970).
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reflect the customary international law norm which prohibits policies
of prolonged indefinite detention of asylum seekers, such as those
utilized in Hong Kong."7 For example, Articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the
European Convention require that all detention be in accordance with
procedures prescribed by law and that every detainee have the right
to a speedy challenge to the lawfulness of his or her detention.""
Article 7(3) of the American Convention provides that "[n]o one shall
be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.""' 9 While' the exact
provisions in the European Convention differ from those in the
Covenant, the cases decided under the European Convention proceed
with the same type of analysis as the cases under the Covenant and
are useful in explicating the meaning and scope of the fundamental
right to be free from arbitrary detention.
The Affaire Winterwerp20 case is the centerpiece of any legal
analysis of arbitrary detention under the European Convention. The
European Court of Human Rights noted that for a detention
proceeding to be lawful, it must comply with local law and the
European Convention.'
In keeping with the domestic law of a
state and the European Convention, where detention is permissible,
it must be in conjunction with an evaluation of all the circumstances
surrounding the detention, including duration, effect, and manner of
implementation."2 Additionally, the European Court of Human
Rights has evaluated whether an individual's detention is arbitrary or
effected for an "ulterior purpose" contrary to Article 5(1)(e) of the
European Convention, when read in conjunction with Article 18.1"
In 1976 the Court applied the criteria set forth in the cases
mentioned above in a situation similar to, but far less egregious than,

117. Hong Kong is not a signatory to either instrument. MJ. BOWMAN & DJ. HARRIS,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 163, 331 (1984). The United
Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights but it has not given
notification under Article 63 that the Convention will apply to Hong Kong. Id. at 163. Article
63(1) of the Convention states: "Any state may at the time of its ratification or at any time
thereafter declare by notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
that the present Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for whose international
relations it is responsible." European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 115, art. 63(1).
118. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 115, art. 5.
119. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 116, art. 7(3).
120. W'mterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.1L (ser. A) (1979).
121. Id.; accord Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 528 (1985).
122. Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 528; see also Engel v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 58-59 (1976).
123. Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 544.
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the circumstances in Hong Kong. In Cyprus v. Turkey'24 the Court

held that the Turkish government's policy of holding groups of Greek
Cypriot refugees in detention centers violated Article 5(1) of the
European Convention." s
Although the Turkish government
presented evidence that most individuals were detained on average
for only two or three months,'26 the Court still found that the
detention amounted to "a deprivation of liberty" within the meaning
of the European Convention."v The fact that the detentions were
carried out in conformance with the Turkish government's military
policy did not alter the Court's conclusion that "[t]he confinement to
these centers was not ordered in accordance with any procedure
prescribed by law." 12
The European Court of Human Rights has also specifically
considered the rights of children in detention. In Bouamar v.
Belgium 29 the Court held that in order to satisfy the minimum
requirements of Article 5 of the European Convention, any placement
of a child in detention "should be resorted to only in exceptional
30
circumstances and [should] be of extremely short duration.'
Furthermore, the Court wrote, "The Belgian State... was under an
obligation to put in place appropriate institutional facilities which met
the demands of security and the educational objectives" of the local
law regarding children.' 3 ' Placing a youth in detention "in conditions of virtual isolation and without the assistance of staff with
educational training cannot be regarded as furthering any educational
aim."" The Court further stated that in the case of children "it is
essential not only that the individual concerned should have the
opportunity to be heard in person but that he should also have the
effective assistance of his lawyer.' ' 33

124. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 482 (1982).
125. MLat 529.
126. Id. at 527.
127. Id. at 529.
128. Id.; see generally Ashingdane, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 544 (providing an example of a
deprivation of liberty that was not beyond the bounds of Article 5(1)(e) of the European
Convention).
129. Boumar v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1987).
130. Id. at 16 (describing the conditions for detention under Belgian law). Belgian law, in
turn, must satisfy Article 5 of the European Convention. Id.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19.
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The Court in Affaire Winterwerp also emphasized the necessity
of predictable procedures when a government seeks to detain an
individual. "[I]t is essential that the person concerned should have
access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or,
where necessary, through some form of representation, failing which
he will not have been afforded the 'fundamental guarantees of
procedure.""'
In particular, detention is unlawful if detainees are
not given an individualized judicial hearing."
Moreover, as with
cases decided under the European Convention, continued detention
may be permissible if a court determines that an individual will
abscond or destroy evidence." 6
IV. UNITED NATIONS JURISDICTION
In the absence of available domestic legal remedies, human rights
organizations have now sought international intervention to stop the
Hong Kong government's continued violations of the Vietnamese
detainees' human rights."37
' Although there is no record of a similar
case having been heard by the United Nations's organs or by any
other international judicial body, the case of the Vietnamese asylum
seekers has been presented to the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (Working Group), which has accepted jurisdiction. 38 The Vietnamese detainees petitioned for relief to the
Working Group not as one of several legal or political avenues to
their freedom, but as their last resort. 39
In 1991 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) created the Working Group for the purpose "[o]f

134. Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 24; accord Weeks v. United Kingdom, 10 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 293 (1987) (Commission report) (noting the inadequacy of proceedings violates Article

5(4)); B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6870/75, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 204 (1987) (maintaining the
need for adequate proceedings in detaining a mental patient).
135. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 115, art. 5(4) ("Everyone who is
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court.").
136. Wemhoff Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25 (1968).
137. Of particular note are the actions taken by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
and the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children in bringing such abuses to the
attention of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
138. The Working Group has made a preliminary determination to accept jurisdiction, and
has sent letters to the governments of Hong Kong and the United Kingdom seeking a response
to the detainees' submission. Telephone Interview with Isaac Bitter, Permanent Representative
of the U.N. Working Group (June 15, 1993).

139. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text (describing the absence of domestic and
international judicial remedies).
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investigating cases of detention imposed arbitrarily or otherwise
inconsistently with the relevant international standards as set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or in the relevant
international legal instruments accepted by the states concerned."'"
The Commission created the Working Group to address violations of
customary international law which are inherent in acts of arbitrary
detention, regardless of a state's accession to any particular human
rights instrument. The Working Group's mandate of investigating
cases of arbitrary detention reflects this decision.' 4'
To date, the Working Group has construed its mandate broadly. 42 First, it has asserted that it has jurisdiction to consider all
situations in which governments detain individuals, not merely cases
involving criminal charges.'43 For example, the Working Group has
recognized that arbitrary detention may result, as it has here, from the

exercise of an individual's right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution under Article 14(1) of the
Universal Declaration.'
Indeed, the intercession of the Working
Group is particularly vital in cases where politically powerless asylum
seekers have been deprived of rights or remedies under domestic law

140. Commission on Human Rights Res. 42, U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 8,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4 (1991); Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Item 10, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Report];see also Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Item 10, at 3 U.N. Doe. EICN.A (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Report]. In addition, the Working Group is charged with seeking and receiving
"information from Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations,"
as well as from the individuals concerned, their families, or their representatives, and with
presenting comprehensive reports to the Commission at its annual sessions. Id. at 3. The
Working Group, however, lacks explicit authority to order governments to conform their
behavior to international norms.
141. See Body of Principlesfor the Protectionof All Persons Under Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988) [hereinafter Body of Principles];UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note 2,
art. 9; 1993 Report, supra note 140, at 8-13; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702(e) (1986) (recognizing that prolonged arbitrary

detention violates customary international law).
142. See 1993 Report,supra note 140, at 4-6 (describing the Working Group's activities); 1992
Report,supra note 140, at 3 (describing the Working Group's mandate).
143. The mandate cites Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
makes no distinction between criminal detention and other forms of detention. See 1992 Report,
supra note 140, at 3.
144. Id. at 10.
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and where, as here, the international legal system provides no other
means of redress. 45
Second, even when a state has adhered to its own domestic law,
the Working Group has recognized its obligation to consider "whether
this internal law conforms to international standards."'" Thus, the
fact that Hong Kong's policy of prolonged indefinite detention of the
Vietnamese may be carried out in accordance with domestic laws 47
is no defense before the Working Group, which is charged to consider
whether those domestic laws are "in contradiction with international
standards.""4
Third, the Working Group has appropriately refused to take an
overly technical view of the application of international law conventions to a state's acts of arbitrary detention. For example, the
Working Group has determined that it has jurisdiction to investigate
and to report on any state's violations of customary international law
because that customary law binds every state, regardless of its status
as a signatory of specific international instruments. 49 In addition,
the Working Group has recently stated that "the Covenant... has a
binding effect with respect to party states and a declaratory effect with
respect to non-party states."' 50 The Working Group has adopted the
term "accepted declaratory instrument" to describe the Covenant
"insofar as states which have yet to ratify it are concerned; and hence
to take it into consideration when determining whether a deprivation
of freedom is arbitrary."''
This treatment of the Covenant is
proper because the Covenant does not itself create a new normative
international rule prohibiting arbitrary detention. Instead, that
normative rule, expressed in Article 9 of the Universal Declaration
and in the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, predates the Covenant and
binds all states, regardless of their formal accession to the Covenant.
Thus, the Working Group has jurisdiction to investigate

145. See Reed Brody, The United Nations Creates a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 709,710-15 (1991) (equating the potential of this Working Group with other
human rights working groups).
146. See 1992 Report, supra note 140, at 3.
147. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
148. See 1992 Report, supra note 140, at 3.
149. See Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9; see also Commission
on Human Rights Res. 42, supra note 140, at 8 and accompanying text.
150. See 1993 Report, supra note 140, at 12.
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 141.
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Hong Kong's arbitrary detention of the Vietnamese and to demand
that Hong Kong desist from its detention policy, regardless of the
technical niceties concerning whether the Covenant "has a binding
effect" on Hong Kong with respect to the Vietnamese. 53
Under the Working Group's broad view of its mandate, case law
decided under the Covenant and similar instruments"M should also
be an important tool of the Working Group, whether or not the state
in question is a signatory to the Covenant or other binding instruments. 55 Past decisions under Article 9(1) of the Covenant and
Article 5 of the European Convention provide one of the few sources
that explicate the meaning and scope of the term "arbitrary detention.' 56 It makes little sense to foreclose the Working Group from
considering this developing body of law to determine the scope and
meaning of "arbitrary detention" as a matter of customary international law,157 regardless of whether Hong Kong is strictly bound by
the Covenant or other international treaties with respect to the
Vietnamese.
Fourth, the Working Group has appropriately determined "that
it is not within its mandate to require local remedies to be exhausted
in order for a communication to be declared admissible."' 58 Thus,
the question of available domestic law remedies for the Vietnamese
is not relevant to the Working Group's jurisdiction to investigate this
matter. In this particular case, that final legal nuance is moot; there
are no effective domestic legal remedies available to the Vietnamese.5 9 The Vietnamese are detained upon arrival pursuant to an
order of an immigration official, and have no right6°to come before a
court to consider the lawfulness of the detention.'
V. CONCLUSION
Hong Kong's humane deterrence policy, intended to deter
Vietnamese from coming to Hong Kong through the use of prolonged
153. See Body of Principles,supra note 141 and accompanying text; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 2.
154. See supra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
155. See UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, supra note 2.

156. See supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
157. The fundamental norms upon which decisions concerning arbitrary detention are based
may be found in the Body of Principles, supra note 141. The application of these principles to
customary international law has been recognized. See 1993 Report, supra note 140, at 12.
158. 1993 Report, supra note 140, at 10.
159. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
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arbitrary detention, is cruel, unfounded, and violates international law.
The Ordinance singles out the Vietnamese for this inhumane
treatment and fails to provide even the most minimal procedural
safeguards. The Vietnamese have no right to an individualized
determination nor the right to challenge the underlying legality of the
detention.
In order to conform to international law, Hong Kong should
immediately parole the Vietnamese, allowing them to remain free in
the community pending a determination of their future. While the
Hong Kong government may deport illegal aliens or provide a
temporary haven for refugees who will be resettled, it may not keep
the Vietnamese locked in detention indefinitely, pending larger
political solutions which history shows may take decades. The Hong
Kong authorities must provide an individualized hearing to all the
Vietnamese presently being held in detention, and have an obligation
to free all those who pose no danger to society and no a risk of flight.
Under this standard, the large majority of Vietnamese, and most
significantly virtually every woman and child, should be freed from
detention and the violence and denigration they presently face. At a
minimum, Hong Kong should return to its former policy of open
centers, allowing the Vietnamese to be free during the day to work or
attend school. Open camps would also permit international organizations to monitor and prevent continuing human rights abuses.
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
recently accepted jurisdiction in a petition filed on behalf of the
Vietnamese. The Working Group determined, in a case of first
impression, that its jurisdiction was not limited to individual claimants
and suggested that its broad mandate included considering whether
the prolonged detention of approximately 45,000 Vietnamese asylum
seekers is a violation of international law which prohibits arbitrary
detention. Hong Kong has been given until December 1, 1993, to
defend its policy. Thereafter, the Working Group will issue a decision
on the merits. Recently, Hong Kong has granted refugee status to
and released two of three named class members in the petition
submitted on behalf of all the Vietnamese in detention in Hong Kong.
This release may be a harbinger of a truly humane and lawful policy
toward the long-suffering Vietnamese detainees.

